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AUCTIONING CLASS SETTLEMENTS
JAY TIDMARSH*
ABSTRACT
Although class actions promise better deterrence at a lower cost,
they are infected with problems that can keep them from delivering
on this promise. One of these problems occurs when the agents for the
class—the class representative and class counsel—advance their own
interests at the expense of the class. Controlling agency cost, which
often manifests itself at the time of settlement, has been the impetus
behind a number of class action reform proposals.
This Article develops a proposal that, in conjunction with reforms
in fee structure and opt-out rights, controls agency costs at the time
of settlement. The idea is to allow the court, once a settlement has
been achieved, to put the class’s claims up for auction, with the
settlement acting as a reserve price. An entity that outbids the
settlement becomes owner of the class’s claims and may continue to
pursue the case against the defendant. A successful auction results
in more compensation for the class. On the other hand, if no bids are
received, the court has evidence that the settlement was fair. The
prospect of a settlement auction also deters class counsel and the
defendant from negotiating a sweetheart deal that sells out the class.
The Article works through a series of theoretical and practical
issues in settlement auctions, including the standards that a court
should use to evaluate bids, the limitations on who may bid, and
ways to encourage the emergence of an auction market.
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INTRODUCTION
The cases and literature on class actions contain some radical
ideas. Among them are auctioning the class’s claims to the highest
bidder;1 auctioning the position of class counsel to the lowest
responsible bidder;2 employing third-party financiers, who take a
share of any class settlement in return for providing funds to
prosecute the case;3 and handing over the victims’ small-stakes
claims to a charity or advocacy group.4
All of these ideas have  two premises at their foundation. First,
class actions are valuable because they can achieve significant
deterrence, especially in small-value cases for which individual
litigation is not an option.5 Second, class actions are dangerous
1. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1991). Under this proposal, the proceeds of the auction would be distributed to
class members whose claims against the defendant are extinguished. The winning bidder is
then free to prosecute the claims against the defendant. See id.
2. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (employing a
lead counsel auction). Although never popular, the lead counsel auction was most common in
securities litigation. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection
of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 664-65 (2002). As a practical matter,
this process screeched to a halt in 2003 when the Third Circuit forbade nearly all lead counsel
auctions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). See In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 273 (3d Cir. 2001).
3. For arguments that financiers can better monitor class counsel than class members
can, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1273 (2012); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 339-43 (2010). For a positive appraisal of litigation
financing, see Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010). For a thoughtful discussion developed as a structured set of
questions that judges must consider, see Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do Judges
Need to Know?, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 525 (2012). Third-party financing of the kind
I describe here—in which the investor agrees to loan money in return for a percentage of the
class’s recovery, with no recourse to class members or counsel—has been used in some
countries. See Burch, supra, at 1301-02.
4. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., 731 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A time-saving
alternative might be a class action with the stated purpose, at the outset of the suit, of a
collective award to a specific charity. We are not aware of such a case, but mention the
possibility of it for future reference.”). This proposal would apply only when putative class
members held claims with a “negative value”—in other words, claims in which individual
recovery would be so small that individual lawsuits would not be worthwhile. Id. at 677-78.
5. See id. at 677.
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because individual plaintiffs have either limited capacity or an
insufficient financial stake to monitor the work of their agents—the
class representatives and class counsel.6 Without monitoring,
representatives or counsel may engage in self-dealing, reaping a
large recovery or fee for themselves while settling the claims of class
members for pennies on the dollar.7
The trick is to harness the deterrence potential of class actions
while slashing agency costs to a minimum. Auctioning the position
of class counsel seeks to control agency costs directly by subjecting
attorneys’ fees to market competition.8 The other three propos-
als—auctioning the class’s claims, using third-party financing, and
giving the right to recover on the class’s claims to a charity or
advocacy group—control agency costs indirectly by steering the
claims into the hands of a single person (a bidder, a financier, or a
charity) with a sufficient stake to monitor counsel effectively.9
This Article suggests a simple strategy to control agency costs
that blends aspects of all four approaches. When the parties in a
6. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 14.
7. In two instances, some class members may not receive even pennies on the dollar.
First, some courts have used a cy pres theory to award funds obtained on the class’s behalf to
a charity—typically because the number of claimants or the modest size of any unclaimed
recovery made distribution to individual class members economically infeasible. See In re
Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir. 2013) (“When excess settlement funds
remain after claimants have received the distribution they are entitled to under the terms of
the settlement agreement, there are three principal options for distributing the remaining
funds—reversion to the defendant, escheat to the state, or distribution of the funds cy pres.”);
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.07 (2010) [hereinafter AGGREGATE
LITIGATION] (permitting cy pres relief when funds remain “because some class members could
not be identified,” and when “the amounts involved are too small to make individual
distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such further
distributions impossible or unfair”); see also In re Lupron Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677
F.3d 21, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2012) (permitting a court to give unclaimed funds in a case involving
overcharges for prostate drug to prostate cancer research and other related research); In re
Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2011) (overturning
approval of a settlement that provided some injunctive relief to class members but provided
monetary recovery only to charities); Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423,
435-36 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing permissible uses of cy pres relief). Second, in rare cases a
class member may end up owing money as a result of a class settlement. The most famous
example is that of Dexter Kamilewicz, who received a $2.19 payout in a class settlement but
was charged $91.33 to pay for class counsel’s fees and costs. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Bost.
Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 508 (7th Cir. 1996). 
8. Cf. Fisch, supra note 2, at 667.
9. See supra notes 1, 3-4.
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class action arrive at a settlement, the court should put the
settlement up for auction. If third parties bid more for the case than
the settlement offer, the proceeds of the highest bid are distributed
to the class. Ownership of the class’s claims shifts to the winning
bidder, who has an incentive to monitor counsel while continuing to
press the case against the defendant.
Although the proposal is easy to state, it poses practical difficul-
ties. Part I begins the examination of these issues by framing the
problems that a settlement auction is designed to alleviate. Part II
outlines the auction process and describes the conditions under
which an auction can help to reduce agency costs and to ensure fair
settlements. Part III addresses a series of practical concerns that
settlement auctions raise and demonstrates how an auction process
responsive to these concerns helps class actions to deliver more
compensation and provide more deterrence.
I. POTENTIAL AND PITFALLS IN CLASS LITIGATION
Aggregating similar claims in a single lawsuit can create
significant benefits. Principal among them are forcing defendants
to internalize the full costs of their wrongdoing,10 equalizing the
incentives for plaintiffs and defendants to invest in litigation,11
lowering per-claim transaction costs,12 providing compensation to
victims,13 and ensuring the like treatment of like claimants.14 But
10. See Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 323, 346
n.97 (2012) (“If one is truly committed to welfare maximization, one must ensure that
potential injurers internalize the costs of negligent conduct.”).
11. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 848 (2002) (“[O]ne benefit of class action scale economies
is [to] motivate courts as well as parties to invest in litigation so as to achieve optimal
deterrence and insurance.”).
12. See id. at 847 (“Class action scale economies produce the well-known benefit of
avoiding duplicative litigation over common questions.”); see also Bruce L. Hay & David
Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy,
75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1383 (2000) (“[A class action] enables plaintiffs to exploit the
‘economies of scale’ the defendant already naturally enjoys from treating separate claims as
a single litigation unit.”).
13. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1997) (“Securities class actions proceed with the objective of permitting those
separated wrongfully from their wealth to get some of it back.”).
14. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM
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aggregation also creates the risk of substantial costs. Among these
are aggregation’s potential to overdeter behavior,15 deprive individu-
als of their right to a “day in court,”16 and increase transaction costs.
The most significant transaction costs derive from three sources.
The first transaction costs are the additional costs of litigation. In
cases in which individual losses are very small, which are often
referred to as “negative-value cases,”17 the parties and the court
incur no litigation expenses, absent the plaintiffs’ capacity to
aggregate their claims, because the cases are too expensive to bring
individually.18 In addition, class actions and other aggregate
L. REV. 3193, 3201 (2013) (noting the “role of group litigation in promoting equality” with
respect to “two separate functions: access to the law declaration (vindication) and distributive
justice (remedies)”).
15. There are two overdeterrence concerns. One is liability for technical violations that
are punishable by damages far in excess of actual loss. For instance, as originally written, the
Truth in Lending Act made each violation punishable by a $100 fine, even if the actual loss
was less. Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 130, 82 Stat. 157 (1968) (codified with
some differences in language at 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2012)). Thus, a minor violation could lead
to crushing liability. Cf. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (holding that a class action seeking a $100-per-violation Truth in Lending Act penalty
for the defendant’s technical error in the bills of 13,000 credit-card customers was not a
superior way to resolve the dispute when no customer lost money). The second overdeterrence
concern involves a law-abiding defendant who pays a substantial sum to settle frivolous or low
merit claims in order to avoid the risk of ruinous aggregate liability. See In re Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing the “concern with forcing these
defendants to stake their companies on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear
of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability”); id. at 1298 (describing
these “settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action
[as] ‘blackmail settlements’”). This second form of overdeterrence is a type of error cost. See
infra note 21 and accompanying text.
16. For the most trenchant criticism of class actions on individual-autonomy grounds,
arguing that class actions are inconsistent with the autonomy that undergirds liberal
democracy, see generally MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT (2009).
17. See In re Baby Prods. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Some class
actions are based on so-called negative value claims, that is, claims that could not be brought
on an individual basis because the transaction costs of bringing an individual action exceed
the potential relief.”).
18. This cost must be weighed against the benefits of providing cost-effective relief and
deterring defendants from cheating large numbers of people out of small amounts of money.
Indeed, an axiom of present class action practice is the class action’s special utility in
negative-value cases. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)
(noting that although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) “does not exclude from
certification cases in which individual damages run high,” the dominant function of Rule
23(b)(3) has been the “vindication of ‘the rights of groups of people who individually would be
without effective strength to bring their opponents into court at all’ ” (quoting Benjamin
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litigation often involve other expenses—such as notice to the class19
and additional judicial management20—that ordinary cases do not.
The second set of transaction costs are error costs. The aggregation
of claims may distort both the likelihood of recovery and the amount
of recovery in relation to individual litigation, thus generating a
litigation premium that defendants must pay.21
Third, aggregate litigation may generate agency costs, which can
arise when an asset owned by a principal is placed in the hands of
an agent. The agent may have an incentive to maximize personal
profit rather than the profit of the principal.22 The consequence is
agency cost, which has three components: the principal’s costs of
monitoring the agent, the principal’s costs of providing incentives
that ensure the fidelity of the agent, and any difference between the
asset’s value in the hands of a faithful agent and the actual value
realized by a self-interested agent.23
Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969))); In re Rhone-
Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1299 (“In most class actions—and those the ones in which the rationale
for the procedure is most compelling—individual suits are infeasible because the claim of each
class member is tiny relative to the expense of litigation.”). 
19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (e)(1) (detailing circumstances in which class members
receive notice).
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2) (describing case-management powers of judges); MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 10.13 (2004) (urging judges to manage complex litigation
actively).
21. See Irwin A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Consolidation of Plaintiffs: The
Effects of Number of Plaintiffs on Jurors’ Liability Decisions, Damage Awards, and Cognitive
Processing of Evidence, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 909, 914, 917 (2000) (reporting experimental
data showing that the likelihood of recovery increases as more plaintiffs are aggregated, but
that the average damage award decreases if more than four plaintiffs are aggregated); Irwin
A. Horowitz & Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Outlier Presence, Plaintiff Population Size,
and Aggregation of Plaintiffs on Simulated Civil Jury Decisions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209,
226 (1988) (reporting experimental data showing that the aggregation of claims increases the
likelihood of recovery for weak claims, but suppresses the value of strong claims). The data
do not reveal whether the increase in the probability of recovery and the decrease in per-
claimant recovery wash out, or whether class actions require defendants to pay more than
they should. Excess payments, which are a type of error cost, must then be balanced against
the cost that would be incurred if some of the aggregated plaintiffs did not file individual
suits, for the failure to provide any remedy to deserving victims is itself an error cost. See
generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 593-95 (7th ed. 2007) (discussing
error costs).
22. Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 12 (noting that lawyers as the agents of their
clients rarely have interests that are “perfectly aligned” with those of their clients).
23. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“In most
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In aggregate litigation, little monitoring occurs,24 so the most
significant agency costs arise from loss in claim value due to self-
serving representation. Loss in claim value arises from two sources.
First, the class representatives, or other individuals that lead the
group, may use the group’s claims to leverage more favorable
treatment for their own claims relative to the claims of others in the
group.25 Second, class counsel may sell out the entire group’s claims
in return for a hefty fee.26 Agency costs do not occur in every case,
but the inevitability of conflicts among group members and between
the group and counsel makes these costs a constant risk.27
agency relationships the principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding
costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence
between the agent’s decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the
principal.” (footnote omitted)).
24. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2056 (2012) (“Participants in many class actions lack rational incentives
to monitor class counsel when they have comparatively small stakes in the entire
enterprise.”).
25. In some instances class representatives receive valuable recoveries that other class
members do not. See, e.g., Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 2013) (holding that when the class representative’s receipt of a large incentive payment
was conditioned on support for the settlement, “the incentive awards here corrupt the
settlement by undermining the adequacy of the class representatives and class counsel”);
Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC, 708 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir. 2013) (rejecting a settlement
in which “the class representatives [had] no interest in vigorously prosecuting the unnamed
class members’ most important interest—the ability to ... contest their debts in court”
because, under the settlement, “the class representatives’ debts [were] forgiven”). The
representative may sell out the interests of only some class members. See, e.g., supra note 7
(discussing Dexter Kamilewicz case). Not all differential payments between representatives
and the group necessarily involve agency cost issues. For instance, courts often approve
modest additional payments to class representatives to compensate them for their time and
effort in being deposed or otherwise assuming responsibilities not borne by class members.
See, e.g., Silberblatt v. Morgan Stanley, 524 F. Supp. 2d 425, 435-36 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(awarding some, but not all, of the additional compensation the class representative sought).
26. Creative Montessori Learning Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir.
2011) (“We and other courts have often remarked the incentive of class counsel, in complicity
with the defendant’s counsel, to sell out the class by agreeing with the defendant to
recommend that the judge approve a settlement involving a meager recovery for the class but
generous compensation for the lawyers—the deal that promotes the self-interest of both class
counsel and the defendant and is therefore optimal from the standpoint of their private
interests.”).
27. For discussions of the inherent conflicts among class members, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litiga-
tion, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 385-93 (2000); Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of
Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1158-75 (2009). The same conflicts exist in other
aggregated litigation. See Charles Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of
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As litigation, error, and agency costs rise in relation to benefits,
aggregation by class action or other means becomes less attractive.28
Therefore, considerable attention has been paid to keeping these
costs at their minimum. With regard to agency costs, Rule 23—the
federal class action rule—created structural safeguards that can
reduce these costs.29 First, a court must find that both the class
representative(s) and class counsel are adequate.30 Second, a court
must approve all class settlements and can do so only when it finds
that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”31
But these safeguards do not end the concern about agency costs.
At a legal level, the present law on “adequate representation” is too
broad in some ways and too narrow in others to sufficiently ferret
out all self-dealing behavior by representatives and counsel.32 Nor
do these safeguards presently pertain to nonclass aggregate
litigation.33 At a practical level, these protections have not elimi-
nated self-regarding behavior. There are enough examples of such
behavior—Dexter Kamilewicz’s settlement;34 settlements in which
Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1468-69 (1998)
(“There being no way to eliminate conflicts [of interest] from multiple-claimant represen-
tations, the only question is how to deal with them.”).
28. Cf. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 1.04 cmt. E (“Maximizing [the net value
of a group of claims] is a central object of aggregate litigation.”).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4), (g).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). The Supreme Court made clear that the standards of adequate
representation and fair settlement are distinct; in particular, a fair settlement does not prove
the adequacy of the representation. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620-22
(1997).
32. The Supreme Court has squarely addressed adequacy of representation only twice, in
both cases finding conflicts of interest between the class representatives and some of the class
members. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625-28; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-45 (1940). The
Court has never addressed adequacy in the context of a conflict between the class and its
counsel. This focus on conflicts as a measure of adequacy poses problems. Given the
inevitability of conflicts among class members, a literal focus on conflicts would doom every
class action. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Conversely, focusing on conflicts fails
to catch cases in which the class representative and counsel achieve an inadequate result on
behalf of the class.
33. Cf. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 1.05 (recommending that a concept of
adequate representation be applied even in nonclass aggregate litigation); Charles Silver, The
Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
1985, 1987-91 (2011) (arguing that nonclass lead counsel should have fiduciary obligations
to aggregated claimants).
34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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class members received nearly worthless coupons and class counsel
walked away with large fees;35 settlements in which class counsel’s
own clients received greater benefits than those afforded class
members under the settlement;36 and other settlements in which
class members stood to receive nothing of value, but class counsel
stood to profit handsomely37—to dispel any notion that the doctrine
of adequate representation eliminated self-dealing. Likewise, courts’
lack of knowledge about the strength of the claims, as well as many
courts’ desire to move big cases off their dockets, renders the “fair,
reasonable, and adequate” check on settlements an imperfect
mechanism to avoid agency costs.38
35. Two classic examples are: the Playboy Club litigation, in which class members
received a chit for a drink, and class counsel received $275,000 in fees; and the GM Pick-Up
Truck litigation, in which class members received a $1,000 coupon, usable only within fifteen
months, toward the purchase of the same type of truck (or $500 toward any other GM vehicle,
with certain restrictions), and counsel received $9.5 million in fees. For two retellings of the
Playboy Club litigation, in which the settlement was approved, see Milton Handler, The Shift
from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1971); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters
and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664,
679 (1979). For a discussion of the GM Pick-up Truck settlement, in which the settlement was
rejected on appeal, see In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability
Litigation, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995). Supposed abuses of coupon settlements led Congress
to enact legislation that both required close judicial scrutiny and limited attorneys’ fees as
mechanisms to curb the practice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012).
36. A side agreement that provided additional benefits to class counsel’s individual clients
(who were not part of the class) became one of the grounds on which the Amchem settlement’s
fairness was attacked, although the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court ultimately rejected
the settlement for different reasons. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246,
294-99 (E.D. Pa. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff ’d, 521 U.S. 597
(1997); see also Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1052-57 (1995) (critiquing the Amchem settlement
on this ground).
37. See, e.g., In re BabyProds. Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 176 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting
concern about the limited amount of compensation going to class members); Dennis v. Kellogg
Co., 697 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (disapproving a settlement in which half of the settlement
award was set aside for cy pres relief); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185 (5th
Cir. 2010) (disapproving a settlement in which attorneys’ fees and costs consumed the bulk
of the award, leaving only a modest amount for possible cy pres distribution).
38. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 829 (1997)
(“No matter how virtuous the judge, the fact remains that courts are overworked, they have
limited access to quality information, and they have an overwhelming incentive to clear their
docket. They cannot reliably police the day-to-day interests of absent class members.”
(footnote omitted)); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory
Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1468 (2006) (noting “the informational problems facing
the trial judge” in “assess[ing] the strengths and weaknesses of the plaintiffs’ claims”); cf.
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A number of proposals designed to cut down on agency costs have
stepped into this gap.39 To start, there are the ideas discussed at the
beginning of this Article.40 In addition, some commentators have
suggested creative uses of attorneys’ fees to give counsel less
incentive to sell out the class.41 Others have recommended that
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 4 (“[J]udicial review of settlements and fee requests ... is
often haphazard, unreliable, and lacking in administrable standards.”). Federal courts have
adopted multifactor tests—often involving nine factors, but sometimes supplementing those
with six or even eleven additional factors—to test a class settlement’s fairness. See Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2005) (listing nine factors); In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 323 & n.73 (3d Cir. 1998)
(listing six factors and offering an additional eleven in a footnote). The factors tend to be
weighted toward the risks and costs of continued litigation in comparison to the proposed
settlement. As in any multifactor test, however, the weighing of the factors is open-ended and
subject to manipulation.
39. Some scholars have argued that, at least with respect to negative-value claims that
are aggregated in a class action, failing to compensate class members adequately—and by
extension failing to reduce agency costs—are not troubling concerns. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2010) (arguing that
in small-stakes class actions, “it is hard to see, as a theoretical matter, why the lawyers
should not receive everything and leave nothing for class members at all”); Myriam Gilles &
Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (2006) (“[T]he so-called ‘agency cost’
problem is mostly a mirage.... In reality, there is generally no legitimate utilitarian reason to
care whether class members with small claims get compensated at all.”). These arguments,
which see class actions purely in deterrence terms, miss the mark. Private litigation is Janus-
faced; it seeks to deter, but it does so by compensating the victims. Cf. POSNER, supra note 21,
at 192 (noting that compensation provides an incentive to sue). As long as a class action has
a preclusive effect on class members’ claims, denying class members the ability to reap
whatever value their claims enjoy in an aggregated process through the transfer of that
wealth to a third person requires an account of class actions and private litigation different
from the one presently in use for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Furthermore, the point
at which an agent is willing to settle may not be the socially optimal settlement point, thus
frustrating the goal of adequate deterrence.
40. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
41. For two such proposals, which differ substantially, see Kevin M. Clermont & John D.
Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529, 546-50 (1978); Hay &
Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1394-402. The Clermont-Currivan proposal was designed for
single-plaintiff litigation, but can be applied to class actions or other mass litigation. See
Clermont & Currivan, supra, at 584 n.185; see also JAY TIDMARSH, CLASS ACTIONS: FIVE
PRINCIPLES TO PROMOTE FAIRNESS AND EFFICIENCY 125-29, 215, 226-33 (2013) (suggesting a
modified Clermont-Currivan approach both to ensure optimal class size and to achieve fair
distribution of class proceeds). Thus far, courts have not adopted either of these fee
approaches, but have tended to compensate counsel either by awarding fees for hours worked
(the lodestar approach, in which the court may enhance the market rate by a multiplier if the
case is highly successful) or by awarding a percentage of the recovery. See, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 121 (adopting a “percentage of the fund” approach); Fischel v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In a common fund
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members of the group be allowed a free right to opt out of a
settlement once its terms become known.42 Broadly, these proposals
seek to control agency costs in one of three ways. One is to transfer
ownership of, or at least a significant stake in, the claims to an
entity with a sufficient financial interest to monitor the counsel’s
performance.43 The second is to use fee or opt-out incentives to keep
counsel from wandering too far from the pursuit of the class’s
interests.44 The third, which is related to the second, is to cap fees
by opening up the counsel position to competitive bidding.45
There are difficulties with all three approaches. The first does not
eliminate agency costs because monitoring expenses still exist. Even
more important, the auction, third-party-financier, and charitable-
case, the district court has discretion to apply either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-
the-fund method in calculating a fee award.”). Both the lodestar and the percentage-of-the-
fund approaches create mismatches between the incentives of counsel to maximize the
attorneys’ fee and the goal of the class to maximize its recovery. See McDaniel v. Cnty. of
Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 418-19 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that in many situations, the lodestar
method leads counsel “to bill as many hours as possible, to do unnecessary work, and for these
reasons also can create a disincentive to early settlement,” while the percentage-of-the-fund
approach “can create perverse incentives of its own, potentially encouraging counsel to settle
a case prematurely once their opportunity costs begin to rise”).
42. For a seminal article examining the right of class members to exit, see Coffee, supra
note 27, at 417-28. At present, courts must give class members an opportunity to opt out in
class actions “wholly or predominately for money judgments.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)
(requiring an opt-out right in (b)(3) class actions); Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
811-12 & n.3 (1985) (requiring such a right as a matter of due process). In a previously
certified (b)(3) class action, a court may, but need not, provide a second opt-out right at the
time of settlement. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4). In nonclass litigation, each client can in theory
“opt out” by ending the attorney-client relationship and retaining different counsel. But they
must compensate the lawyer for time spent; moreover, in recent years, lawyers have
increasingly crafted client contracts that make it difficult for individual clients to extract
themselves from group litigation. See AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 3.17
(recommending that under certain conditions including prior consent, clients are bound to
accept a settlement as long as a substantial majority of other clients represented by the same
lawyer on the same matter vote to accept the settlement). But see Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson
Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006) (rejecting such an approach).
43. This idea underlies prior proposals: to auction the class’s claims to a single bidder, see
supra note 1 and accompanying text; to rely on a third party to finance the litigation, see
supra note 3 and accompanying text; and to give class members’ negative-value claims to a
public-interest organization, see supra note 4 and accompanying text. Because a defendant
can bid on the claim at auction, the auction proposal does not invariably result in ownership
passing to an entity with an incentive to monitor counsel; a defendant who wins the bid will
drop the case. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 108.
44. See Coffee, supra note 27, at 421.
45. Cf. Fisch, supra note 2, at 667.
2014] AUCTIONING CLASS SETTLEMENTS 239
endowment approaches all occur at, or near, the outset of the case
when the value of the victims’ claims is often difficult to deter-
mine.46 As a result, bidders or financiers will expect a significant
discount on the true value of the claims to proceed—thus thwarting
the delivery of a realistic level of compensation to victims.47 And
public-interest groups may be reluctant to take up the sword
against well-armed defendants, assuming that litigation is even a
part of the modus operandi of such groups. The second approach
requires use of the right fee or opt-out structure to align the
interests of class and counsel. But even a proper structure cannot
account for all agency costs associated with self-regarding legal
representation,48 nor will providing opt-out rights ensure their
exercise when, and only when, they avoid agency costs.49 The third
46. A recent example of the difficulty of estimating the value of claims at the outset of a
lawsuit occurred during the Madoff bankruptcy, in which a sophisticated claimant traded its
claims in the bankruptcy estate for thirty-two cents on the dollar, and after an aggressive
recovery effort by the bankruptcy trustee, the claims were eventually worth seventy cents on
the dollar. See Nathan Vardi, The Great Baupost Madoff Claim Trade that Made a Big Madoff
Feeder Fund a Loser Again, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2013, 10:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
nathanvardi/2013/01/16/the-great-baupost-madoff-claims-trade-that-made-a-big-madoff-
feeder-fund-a-loser-again [http://perma.cc/5MH6-C5QZ]. I thank Adam Zimmerman for this
point.
47. See Randall S. Thomas & Robert G. Hansen, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative
Lawsuits: A Critical Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 423, 448 (1993) (noting that the auction price
increases when uncertainty over the value of the auctioned good is lower).
48. For instance, the approach recommended by Professor Clermont and Mr. Currivan is
superior to the approach recommended by Professors Hay and Rosenberg because it gives
counsel an incentive to continue to work until (and only until) another dollar spent on legal
representation does not yield another dollar in gain to the client. In contrast, the proposal by
Professors Hay and Rosenberg eliminates the incentive to engage in a sweetheart settlement
but does not otherwise align the interests of class and counsel. Compare Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 41, at 530, with Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1381. Even under
the Clermont-Currivan proposal, attorneys with private agendas within a firm may thwart
the delivery of an optimal level of legal services. See Morris Ratner, A New Model of Plaintiffs’
Class Action Attorneys, 31 REV. LITIG. 757, 761-62 (2012) (describing the effect of these
agendas on the quality of a firm’s legal representation of a class). Moreover, these fee
structures can neither prevent an attempt to undercut an optimal class by filing a dueling
class action, nor thwart a defendant’s efforts to drag the case on beyond the optimal end point
from the standpoint of class and counsel. See TIDMARSH, supra note 41, at 129-30, 223, 230-31
(describing the limits of the Clermont-Currivan approach in avoiding agency costs).
49. On the one hand, few class members exercise their right to opt out. See Vassalle v.
Midland Funding LLC, 708 F.3d 747, 753 (6th Cir. 2013) (reporting an opt-out rate of 0.3
percent in a class action containing 1.4 million members); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 52
(1996) (reporting that the median rate of opting out in class actions contained within the
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approach may limit the size of the fee, but that does not eliminate
the problem of a misalignment of incentives between class and
counsel. Indeed, the third approach may enhance the risk of
misalignment if the fee is set so low that the attorney must cut a
quick deal in order to make any money on the case.
No perfect solution to the problem of agency costs exists. As a
general matter, agency costs arise at the time of, or due to the
prospect of, settlement. The differing interests of class and counsel
in the outcome of the case are most likely to emerge when a deal
is—or is likely to be—on the table. At this point, the fear of selling
out some or all members of the class becomes realistic. Because
most class actions settle, limiting agency costs at the time of
settlement will help to control the problem of sellouts.
II. ENSURING FAIR SETTLEMENTS
The best way to control the risk of diverging interests at the time
of settlement is to use a combination of all three of the basic
techniques to harness agency costs: establish a proper fee structure,
put the claims up for auction, and provide limited opt-out rights.
Establishing the right fee structure is critical to aligning the
incentives of counsel with those of the client. The potential for
agency costs exists unless counsel has an incentive to work exactly
as much as the clients want her to work. In other words, this is
when the point at which the clients would have to pay more in fees
than the value of their claims matches the point at which counsel’s
expected cost of devoting another hour to the case is greater than
the expected benefit that she receives from the fee. Thus, at this
matching point, the clients and counsel both want to cease work.
The only method for matching up these points is to use a contin-
gency fee that compensates counsel through a combination of an
study was between 0.1 percent and 0.2 percent). On the other hand, class members may
choose to opt out even when it is socially optimal for them to remain in the class. In
particular, some class members may strategically opt out in order to extract rents from the
defendant, creating a different type of cost. See Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The
Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY
L.J. 85, 97 (1997) (“[S]ome individual claimants may impose significant externalities on other
litigants through pursuit of disaggregative strategies.”).
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hourly market rate plus a percentage of the net recovery attained
for the class.50
But this fee structure alone is insufficient to ensure an alignment
of interests. It does not prevent the problem of the “reverse auction”
or the “race to the bottom,” which can arise when two overlapping
class actions are filed. Counsel in each class action has an incentive
to underbid the settlement offer of counsel in the other class action,
lest she receive no fees for the efforts in her own case. The process
of underbidding may continue until the defendant achieves a rock-
bottom settlement.51 Some other mechanism(s) must exist to dis-
suade counsel from engaging in this practice.
An auction of the class’s claims provides such a mechanism. The
idea of auctioning the class’s claims is not itself new.52 As originally
described in the literature, an auction of a class’s claims would be
held at the outset of the case. The important tweak that this Article
suggests is conducting the auction at the time that the settlement
is announced.53 Anyone willing to bid more for the claims than the
50. See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 41, at 546-50 (using a marginal-utility analysis
to describe the reasons why this fee creates an alignment of incentives). To align incentives
properly, the fee must also be subject to some side constraints: the fee must be capped at the
amount of recovery to the class; the fund on which the percentage-of-the-net recovery portion
of the fee is calculated must be the award given to the class itself, thus excluding money given
to other entities through cy pres relief; and counsel must know at the outset that this fee
structure will be used. TIDMARSH, supra note 41, at 227; Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and the
Optimal Class Action, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 767, 788-89 (2014).
51. For a discussion of reverse auctions, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma
of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1370-73 (1995). One apparent example
of a reverse auction involved litigation that spilled out of a hostile takeover. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 126 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir.
1997), opinion withdrawn and superseded by 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999); In re MCA, Inc.,
598 A.2d 687 (Del. Ch. 1991). Although reverse auctions appear to occur infrequently, the
problem should be addressed as long as the benefits of preventing reverse auctions outweigh
the costs.
52. E.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 1 (writing a seminal article); see Thomas & Hansen,
supra note 47 (providing a sympathetic critique and refining the plan); see also Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993) (responding to these suggestions). The idea of an auction was
previously discussed but rejected in John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class
and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 691-93 (1986).
53. In a subsequent article, Professor Miller proposed an auction at the time of settlement.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Competing Bids in Class Action Settlements, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 633
(2003). Unlike the proposal in this Article, Professor Miller’s proposal would have auctioned
only the position of lead counsel. Once a settlement was announced, an objecting class
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settlement amount becomes owner of the class’s claims. The class
members then receive any excess over the original settlement in
proportion to the awards that they would have received under the
original settlement or otherwise according to the terms of the bid.54
A settlement auction significantly reduces the prospect of a
reverse auction. In the event that another counsel tries to undercut
the terms of the original settlement by proposing to settle for less,
the original counsel’s response is not to give an even lower price.
The original counsel’s response is to bid the settlement back up to
the original deal, take ownership of the claims, and continue the
case against the defendant.55 The defendant has little incentive to
play the reverse auction game.
The third and final element that assures a fair settlement is the
provision that allows class members to opt out of the settlement
once its terms and payouts to class members are known.56 Although
member who believed that the case had settled too low could bid on the case; if the highest
bid guaranteed that class members would be no worse off than they were under the
settlement, the highest bidder then could choose different lead counsel to continue the
prosecution of the case. Id. at 639-40. If new counsel eventually achieved a better result, the
excess would be distributed pro rata among the class; but if a worse result was achieved, the
bidder would have to make good on the guarantee. Id. at 640. The purpose of this proposal is
to eliminate the problem of reverse auctions. Id. at 649-50.
The proposal in this Article is different. First, class members immediately receive payment
in the amount of the highest bid, rather than waiting for the case to end. See infra Part
III.B.4. In addition, bidders are not limited to objecting class members. See infra Part III.C.
Third, and perhaps most important, the successful bidder retains the full amount of any
excess achieved in subsequent litigation—a fact that should create a broader market for
bidders. See infra Part III.B.4. Finally, although this Article’s proposal also helps to prevent
reverse auctions, its basic purpose is to be one aspect of a set of reforms that achieves the
broader goal of ensuring fair settlements and limiting agency costs. See infra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text (describing the benefits of a settlement auction).
One court in a derivative action attempted a lead counsel auction akin to the one that
Professor Miller proposed. See Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co. (U.S.), C.A. No. 1091-VCL,
2012 WL 1655538, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2012) (giving objecting class members sixty days to
post a bond guaranteeing to the class the amount of the present settlement in the event that
the objectors were to recover less than the settlement amount). In the end, objecting class
members failed to convince the court that their financing arrangement was reasonable from
the viewpoint of the corporation on whose behalf the derivative action was brought. As a
result, the court approved the original settlement. See Forsythe v. ESC Fund Mgmt. Co.
(U.S.), C.A. No. 1091-VCL, 2013 WL 458373, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013).
54. For further discussion of the basic constraints on the bid, see infra Part III.B.1.
55. Admittedly, counsel must have access to means for funding the settlement. See infra
Part III.D (discussing this practical problem).
56. If the settlement occurs in a nonclass aggregation, the equivalent to an opt-out would
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the ability to opt out may not be available as a matter of right in all
class actions,57 a court should nonetheless extend the privilege of
opting out to all class members who can demonstrate that the
marginal expected net loss to the value of the class action from their
departure will be offset by the marginal expected net gain as a
result of their ability to proceed alone.58 This final check provides a
fine-grained ability to ensure that the settlement is in the best
interests of the class and its individual members.59
Therefore, the auction process is just one component in a balanced
set of measures designed to ensure that class members receive
appropriate value for their claims. On its own, the settlement
auction advances the goals of increasing aggregate deterrence and
lowering agency costs, but the proper fee structure and opt-out
rights greatly strengthen its capacity to achieve these goals.
For a settlement auction to work effectively, a number of practical
matters described in Part III must be resolved. For now, let me put
aside these practical matters and make the basic case for an auction
as one component of ensuring a fair class settlement.60 As I have
be the individual’s refusal to consent to the settlement. Because a court can control the right
to opt out more easily than the circumstances under which an individually represented client
refuses to accept a settlement, this part of the discussion does not apply to other aggregate
litigation.
57. No opt-out right exists in class actions brought under Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2).
Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (not mentioning an opt-out right for (b)(1) and (b)(2)
classes), with FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v) (providing an opt-out right in (b)(3) classes). In
extraordinary circumstances, courts can nonetheless allow members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes
to opt out. See Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94-95 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cnty. of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1302-05 (2d Cir. 1990). But see Thomas v. Albright,
139 F.3d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in
permitting plaintiffs to opt out). In addition, a court can allow an additional opt-out
opportunity at the time of settlement in a (b)(3) class action. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4).
58. See TIDMARSH, supra note 41, at 180-86 (providing an analysis of the circumstances
that fulfill this requirement). A class member could also opt out by signing a release
disclaiming any interest in pursuing the claim on an individual basis. Although it seems odd
that a rational individual would prefer no recovery, some people who do not want to be
bothered may prefer to opt out.
59. Although this opt-out right should be available, it should not be the sole mechanism
by which courts determine the fairness of a settlement. See Christopher R. Leslie, The
Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L.
REV. 71, 121-23 (2007) (arguing that courts often misinterpret the significance of opt-outs,
mistakenly believing that those class members who choose not to leave the settlement believe
that the settlement is fair).
60. Although this Article has focused on achieving fair class settlements, the same three
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mentioned, a settlement auction can reduce agency costs by
reducing the risk of a reverse auction.61 But preventing reverse
auctions is only one benefit. Another benefit is the settlement
auction’s ability to move a resource—the class’s legal claims—to the
person who values it most highly.62 Third, and perhaps of greatest
significance, the settlement auction deters sell-outs from the class
and other settlements in which counsel fails to achieve the best
realistic outcome for the class due to self-interest in a large fee.
Faced with the prospect of being outbid by others, and thus
foreclosed from realizing a full fee for the work put into the case,63
counsel has little incentive to agree to a sweetheart deal. The same
is true of the defendant, who cannot be assured of escaping the
litigation unless it pays fair value for the class’s claims. The
emergence of settlement auctions should induce class counsel and
the defendant to settle claims fairly in the first instance.
In addition, the auction process provides some assurance to the
court that the case is settling at the market rate. The court often
has little information whether the settlement is in fact “fair,
reasonable, and adequate.”64 At the time of settlement, class counsel
and the defendant are aligned in arguing that the settlement is a
good deal. Therefore, courts must frequently rely on objectors to
create the necessary counterarguments and to point out the
criteria, including an auction, could in principle apply to other aggregate settlements. See
AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 7, § 1.02 cmt. a (noting that class actions are one form of
aggregate litigation). In practice the difficulty of extending these criteria is finding a source
of power by which a court in nonclass litigation can control the fees, order an auction, and
permit opt-outs. All of these powers can be found in Rule 23. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h)
(permitting a court to award “reasonable attorney’s fees”); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (giving a
court the power to approve a settlement); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(4) (permitting an opt-out right
at settlement). See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(1)(A) (giving courts the power to “determine
the course of proceedings”).
61. See supra text accompanying note 55.
62. See William Vickrey, Auctions, Markets, and Optimal Allocation, in BIDDING AND
AUCTIONING FOR PROCUREMENT AND ALLOCATION 13-14 (Yakov Amihud ed., 1976) (noting that
an “open auction ... assures Pareto optimality”); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030 (1982) (noting that in the
context of tenders offers for a company, an auction “has several socially beneficial effects, such
as the allocation of targets’ assets to their most valuable use”).
63. See infra Part III.F. (discussing the fee that counsel earns when the original
settlement loses to a higher bid). For now it is enough to know that counsel will typically
receive a fee that does not fully compensate for the risk of undertaking the litigation.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
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settlement’s defects. But objectors are not always forthcoming,65 and
their motives are not always pure.66 Moreover, the objection process
still leaves the court with a binary choice: accept or reject the
settlement. Unless the settlement is truly awful, the momentum is
toward acceptance.67 A bidding process provides a third alternative
that can enhance the class’s recovery. On the other hand, if no one
outbids the settlement, the court has external evidence that the
settlement is appropriately valued.68
III. PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF SETTLEMENT AUCTIONS
Although easy to imagine, a settlement auction raises implemen-
tation issues. This Part considers some of the most significant
issues, in particular those issues that affect the auction’s ability to
achieve its goals of increasing deterrence, enhancing compensation,
and reducing agency costs. In the process, this Part further develops
the arguments for a settlement auction.
65. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 49, at 57 (noting that among four federal district
courts, there were no objections filed to class settlements in 42 to 64 percent of the cases);
Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action
Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1532-33 (2004) (reporting
that on average, fewer than 5 percent of the class objected to a settlement in civil rights cases,
and objections in securities and consumer cases were lower); id. (“The overall impression
across the range of cases in the study is that ... objections are extremely uncommon.”).
66. See, e.g., In re Law Office of Jonathan E. Fortman, LLC, No. 4:13MC00042AGF, 2013
WL 414476, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2013) (“[W]hen assessing the merits of an objection to a
class action settlement, courts consider the background and intent of objectors and their
counsel, particularly when indicative of a motive other than putting the interest of the class
members first.”); In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. 112, 159 & n.40
(E.D. La. 2013) (finding no merit in an objection presented by an attorney who had been
“deemed a serial objector” and who “had been found to have engaged in bad faith and
vexatious conduct”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 49, at 58 (noting that no changes in the settlement
were made in 90 percent of the cases in which an objection was filed).
68. Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. APP. CORP.
FIN. 13, 32 (1991) (arguing that one advantage of auctioning off companies in bankruptcy is
that auctions “separate the task of assessing the firm’s value from that of dividing that value
among creditors and equityholders, effectively assigning the first to capital markets and the
second to the courts”).
246 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:227
A. The Auction’s Purpose
An important first issue is to determine the goal of the auction:
to enhance social welfare or to maximize the return to the “sellers”
(the class). As an initial matter, the goal of the auction appears to
be maximizing the return to the victims. But this orientation can
result in a loss of social welfare. If bidders overestimate the value
of the case, which the original settlement had fairly priced, continu-
ing the litigation is not in society’s interests, even though the class
stands to benefit.69
It is a fair point that settlement auctions should be used only if
they enhance social welfare; otherwise, it is best to let the litigation
end with the original settlement. For two reasons, this objection is
not crippling to settlement auctions. First, the auction process’s
ultimate goal is to improve the quality of settlements in class
litigation. Even if a few cases fail to benefit society, those losses
must be balanced against the gains that accrue in other cases in
which an auction yields social gains or in which the in terrorem
effect of an auction leads to a better settlement than counsel might
have otherwise negotiated.
Second, settlement auctions diminish social welfare if bidders
systematically overestimate the value of class settlements. Settle-
ment auctions can also cause a net loss in social welfare when the
defendant’s and the successful bidder’s ongoing litigation expenses
turn out to be greater than the successful bidder’s gains from
continuing to press the case.70 As this last sentence suggests, there
are two situations in which a settlement auction can be socially
harmful: (1) when the bidder pays more than the claims are worth;
and (2) when the bidder pays less than the claims are worth but the
continued cost of litigation is greater than the gain to the bidder.
69. Cf. Peter Cramton et al., Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless
Services, 54 J.L. & ECON. 167, 187 (2011) (noting that “[e]fficient auctions raise substantial
revenues” but that “focusing more on revenues likely distorts the outcome away from social
welfare maximization”); Thomas & Hansen, supra note 47, at 456-57 (noting the potential
divergence between yielding revenue for class members and enhancing social welfare under
a system that auctioned class actions).
70. A successful bidder who presses the case but either loses or recovers less than the bid
has not necessarily made a bad deal; the expected value of the claims at the time of the bid
may have been high enough that the bid was a good value. The text assumes that the
successful bidder made a bad deal.
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The second situation can further be broken down into two scenarios:
(a) when the successful bidder’s attorneys’ fees and other costs are
greater than the difference between the amount the successful
bidder realized and the amount of the bid; and (b) when the fees and
costs the bidder paid are less than this differential, but this
differential is less than what the defendant expended in attorneys’
fees and costs to continue to defend the case.71 In the first situation
and scenario (a) of the second situation, the successful bidder has
lost money; in scenario (b) of the second situation, the bidder has
made money, but the defendant’s expenditures make the lawsuit a
losing proposition from society’s vantage point.
Bidders who make bad deals are not a problem in the long run.
They will either exit the market or adjust their bidding strategies.
In the end, the market will take care of itself. But bid winners who
make a good deal from their private point of view, and then cause
socially wasteful litigation, present another type of problem; there
is no market corrective to stop their behavior.72 There are, however,
two steps that can reduce the likelihood of this behavior.
First, the court should consider the possibility of allowing the
defendant to meet the terms of the winning bid.73 If the defendant
matches the bid, no additional litigation costs arise; the class’s
interest in greater compensation and society’s interest in greater
deterrence match up.
71. I assume that the American rule applies, so that each side bears its own attorneys’
fees and expenses.
72. This circumstance is a specific example of the broader principle that private incentives
can lead parties to make litigation choices that are not socially optimal. For a general
analysis, see Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997).
73. Whether a defendant should be allowed to meet the terms of a winning bid is not as
simple a question as it might seem. First, if matching is allowed, the court must require the
defendant to compensate the winning bidder for the bidder’s reasonable costs of due diligence
investigation and bid preparation, plus (perhaps) a modest premium to compensate the bidder
for the risk that its bid might not have been accepted. Second, allowing a defendant to bid on
the claims against it could drive down the price at auction. See Thomas & Hansen, supra note
47, at 448-49. The same result might be expected if the defendant can match the winning bid.
On the other hand, bid matching can significantly reduce transaction costs. Thus, before
holding the auction, the court must weigh the tendency of bid matching to suppress other bids
against the potential for bid matching to reduce litigation costs, and then determine whether
bid matching is appropriate.
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Second, the court may require that bids exceed the settlement by
an amount that, in the court’s estimation, includes a successful
bidder’s and the defendant’s fees and costs in continued litigation.
For instance, if the case settles for $1 million, and the court believes
that continued litigation will generate a combined $100,000 in fees
and costs for both parties, it might set the minimum bid at $1.1
million. The court’s estimate need not be exact, but the minimum
bid should be set with an eye toward the likely future expenditures
on both sides in order to make sure that continued litigation is
indeed in society’s best interest—in addition to advancing the
interests of the class.
These two steps balance the interests of the class and society. The
second step in particular may discourage some bids that would
increase payments to class members, but society also has an interest
in avoiding wasteful litigation.
B. Bidding
The next issue is to decide how bidding will be conducted. Among
the various types of auctions, four are most common: the sealed-bid
auction; the English auction, in which bidders compete by bidding
up the last amount offered; the Dutch auction, in which the price is
lowered until someone accepts the offer; and the second-price (or
Vickrey) auction, in which a sealed-bid auction is used, but the
highest bidder pays the amount of the second-highest bid.74 Each
has benefits and drawbacks.75
The likeliest form for a settlement auction is the sealed-bid
method. Given that the reserve price—the original settlement plus
any minimum additional amount that the court specifies—is known,
a Dutch auction is less attractive.76 The second-price auction, which
is less common, yields less recovery to the class.77 The real choice
74. See Yaad Rotem & Omer Dekel, The Bankruptcy Auction as a Game—Designing an
Optimal Auction in Bankruptcy, 32 REV. LITIG. 323, 354-57 (2013) (discussing all four forms
of auction, as well as hybrid auctions and other forms).
75. See id. at 358-70 (comparing the processes and their relative merits and weaknesses).
76. Cf. id. at 373 (“[A] non-disclosure policy regarding the reserve price is understandable
and justifiable because disclosure reduces the number of auction participants by eliminating
all of the potential bidders whose valuations are lower than the reserve price.”).
77. See Michael H. Rothkopf et al., Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 94,
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lies between the two most common forms: the sealed-bid and
English auctions. A sealed-bid approach is generally more realistic.
The number of bidders is not likely to be high, thus limiting the
effectiveness of the English approach in driving up bids. Moreover,
a class settlement is not a tangible object whose value is measurable
simply by price. Different bids may contain different elements: some
bids may propose unequal additional compensation for members of
the class, while other bids may propose to spread the additional
compensation equally across the class. The “apples and oranges”
nature of the bids may make it difficult for the auctioneer—the
court—to compare the value of bids in the heat of an English
auction. Finally, sealed-bid auctions have two important advantages
in the settlement auction context. First, they tend to induce risk-
averse bidders to offer a price closer to their actual valuation of the
claims, enhancing revenue for the class; and second, they limit the
possibility of collusive behavior to suppress the bid price.78
Thus, sealed bidding should be the presumptive starting point for
settlement auctions. In some circumstances, the court might find an
English auction a more useful way to obtain greater value for the
class.79 In theory, the choice should not matter. Because the auction
is conducted with a reserve price, either a sealed-bid or an English
auction should maximize the value of the settlement to the class.80
99 (1990) (stating that with risk-averse bidders, “the bid taker can expect more revenue with
a first-price auction than with a second-price auction”). The second-price auction is also
subject to the risk that the class, in collusion with some other entity, could fraudulently place
a bid slightly below the winning bid, thus forcing the winning bidder to pay a higher price
than justified. See id. at 102 (noting that “actual cheating” is not required, but that “the mere
fear of it ... will suffice”). In addition, a second-price auction provides additional information
to the defendant about the actual value that the winning bidder assigns to the
claim—information that may have undesirable effects on the shape of subsequent negotiations
between the winning bidder and the defendant, as well as on negotiations between the
winning bidder and its counsel, experts, and other consultants. See id. at 102-03.
78. In an English auction, prospective bidders can conspire to limit bidding and split any
gain from obtaining the item. Because the auction is conducted in public, the members of the
conspiracy can monitor each other’s behavior and better enforce the collusive pre-auction
agreement. With sealed bids, conspirators cannot be sure of each other’s behavior. See Rotem
& Dekel, supra note 74, at 366-67.
79. See id. at 363-66 (describing circumstances in which an English auction would be
preferable to a sealed-bid auction).
80. See John G. Riley & William F. Samuelson, Optimal Auctions, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 381,
382 (1981) (“[F]or a broad family of auction rules, expected seller revenue is maximized using
either of the two common auctions if the seller announces that he will not accept bids below
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One of the standard difficulties in an auction—which prior
proposals for auctioning class actions did not address—is valuing
the item up for bid.81 If bids are to be encouraged, some type of pre-
auction process to determine the value of the class’s claim’s seems
essential. For this reason, those who have advocated auctioning
class claims have also recommended a judicial process to investigate
the merits of the claims with the results of the process made
available to all potential bidders.82 Of course, such a process raises
questions, such as where the money for the investigation will come
from and whether a judicial adjunct can effectively investigate
claims within the confines of the American adversarial system.
A great advantage of the settlement auction is that, in most cases,
class counsel has already conducted the pre-auction discovery. As
part of the auction process, a court should make this discovery
available to all prospective bidders.83 Of course, in settlement class
actions in which the lawsuit seeks approval of a prenegotiated
settlement,84 no discovery on the merits of the case may have
occurred. But settlement class actions are almost always negotiated
against a backdrop of similar lawsuits that have generated evidence
and arguments on the merits. If necessary, a court may order class
or defense counsel to provide such information to interested bidders.
If the court receives one or more bids, evaluating bids and
selecting the winning bid raises a number of concerns.
1. Standards for Bids
As a rule, courts should accept a bid only when it meets three
criteria: (1) the bid nets more value for the class as a whole than the
settlement offer; (2) no class members end up worse off than they
were under the original settlement, unless the bidder can show that
some appropriately chosen minimum or ‘reserve’ price.”).
81. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 111; Thomas & Hansen, supra note 47, at 450-53.
82. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 52, at 460-61.
83. Because a successful bidder will be required to compensate class counsel for the fair
value of this work, there is no free-rider problem. See infra Part III.F.
84. For two settlement class actions, both of which were ultimately held not to comport
with the terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, see Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 864 (1999) (rejecting a mass-tort settlement class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (rejecting a mass-tort settlement class action
under Rule 23(b)(3)).
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the original settlement gave excessive payments to some class
members as a means of purchasing their acquiescence in an
inadequate settlement; and (3) like class members are generally
treated the same under the terms of the bid.
The three criteria are necessary to make the auction worthwhile.
The first criterion is the bedrock. Unless an auction makes the class
better off as a whole, the reason for holding an auction collapses.
This criterion is already implicit in setting a reserve price, but I
single it out here for two reasons.
First, a bid may propose somewhat different terms than the
original settlement. If the original settlement proposed to settle the
class’s claims for $100 and the highest bid proposed to pay class
members $125, the superiority of the bid to the original settlement
is evident. But now suppose that the original settlement proposed
to pay every class member $100, while a bid proposed $125 pay-
ments in installments over five years. The bid may seem a better
deal, but whether it is in fact better depends on the time value of
money. A court must ensure that, overall, the bid achieves greater
value for the class; otherwise, the deterrence value of class actions
declines, and defendants have a perverse incentive to use surrogate
bidders to undercut the original settlement with a glitzy-sounding,
yet ultimately less valuable, bid.
Second, the first criterion acts as a reminder to the court to
ensure that the bidders are responsible—in other words, that they
can make good on the bid.85 The issue is especially acute in cases in
which the bid requires performance over time, because the highest
bidder’s solvency and capacity to perform in the future must be
evaluated.
The second and third criteria protect the individuals within the
class. Even if the highest bid is more favorable than the settlement
to the class as a whole, the bid might make individuals within the
85. In government contracting, a “responsible bidder” is one with “[t]he ability ... to
properly perform contract work.” News Printing Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 740, 745
(2000). Relevant factors include “financial strength, prior track record, and organizational
skills,” and other criteria specified in the bid. Id. at 746. In settlement auctions, financial
strength—the capacity to make good on the bid—will be a paramount consideration, but other
factors may also enter the picture. To ensure performance, a court may require the highest
bidder to post a bond before award, although the court should weigh the costliness of the bond
against the risk of non-performance.
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class worse off, or it might create differentials among similarly
situated class members. Such a bid puts the court in an impossible
spot. Should it award a bid that is admittedly better for all on the
backs of some class members who stand to lose? Should it allow
differential awards among like claims, especially if the differential
is created for the purpose of tamping down opposition among certain
class members? Such inequities may also engender ill will among
some class members—thus creating the risk of opt-outs, with all the
inefficiencies that multiple lawsuits generate.86
In essence, the three criteria require that the bid be Pareto
superior to the original settlement: no one is made worse off, and at
least some people are made better off.87 But the criteria also limit
the way in which Pareto superiority is achieved. As a rule, like
claimants must be treated alike; the gains cannot be dropped
arbitrarily on just a few of the class members while remaining class
members stand in place.88
2. Partial Bids
An intriguing possibility is the ability to bid for only a portion of
the claims. Assume that each class member has two claims (one
86. Recall that, as a rule, a class member can opt out when she can show that her
expected gain from proceeding outside of the class action is greater than her loss to the class.
See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. If a class member can show, for instance, that
the defendant would have been willing to pay $100 for her claim, but the bid would provide
her with only $75, she has made a prima facie case for opting out—especially if enough other
class members in a similar position signal the same desire so that a new class action
composed of these opt-outs is a possibility.
87. A Pareto improvement occurs when at least one person is made better off by an action
and no one is made worse off. See POSNER, supra note 21, at 12.
88. For instance, assume that a class of 90,000 members involves only negative-value
claims. Further assume that one-third of the class (30,000 members) have weak low-value
claims, one-third of the class have strong moderate-value claims, and one-third of the class
have strong high-value claims. The original settlement called for a total payment of $9
million, with $0 going to the weak low-value claims, $100 to the moderate claims, and $200
to the higher-value claims. If the bidding process results in a winning bid of $13.5 million, or
fifty percent more than the original settlement offer, each class member would be entitled as
a rule to a payment fifty percent larger—or $0 to the low-value claims, $150 to the moderate-
value claims, and $300 to the high-value claims. Such a bid would meet the three bidding
criteria. But the bid may in its terms specify a different distribution, perhaps $50 to the weak
claims with the remaining $3 million in excess funds distributed proportionally between the
moderate-value and high-value claims. This bid also meets the three criteria.
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federal, one state), and the claims fall into one of three categories:
low value, medium value, and high value. The defendant agrees to
settle both claims for all class members, paying $25 to the low-value
claimants, $300 to the medium-value claimants, and $1,000 to the
high-value claimants. A bidder may think that the payment for
some of these claims is fair and may wish to pursue only some of the
claims or the claims of only some of the class members. The issue is
whether the bidder may do so, thus leaving the remaining claims
and claimants to be compensated by the defendant, or whether it
must bid on the entire settlement.
With respect to claims, the clear answer is that a bidder cannot
bid on only some of the class members’ claims. If the rule were
otherwise, enormous difficulties in valuation would arise. Presum-
ably the defendant’s settlement offer already accounted for the
variability in the strength of the claims. If a bidder could strip out
the most valuable claims, then the value of the original settlement
would need to be adjusted; expecting a defendant to pay the same
amount in settlement when the most valuable claims are not settled
would be unfair. But that adjustment would lead to new rounds of
negotiation or would require the court to approximate the contribu-
tion of each legal theory to the overall value of the settlement—a
task that would likely demand an unappealing trial on the merits.89
Whether a bidder can propose to buy the claims of only some
claimants is a harder matter. In some settlements, the same
valuation issues can arise. If the settlement proposes to settle the
class’s claims for $5 million in total, with no indication of how the
settlement funds are to be allocated,90 then the problem of determin-
ing the allocation of funds among claimants is functionally identical
to the problem of allocating funds among claims that the prior
paragraph described. At some point, however, an allocation plan
89. In unique circumstances the defendant may agree to settle each claim for a specified
amount—perhaps $25 for the first legal theory and $75 for the second. Here, partial bidding
on one claim is possible. But such settlements are rare.
90. Such settlements are not uncommon in practice, and put enormous ethical pressure
on counsel to determine the allocation of funds among the clients. See John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need
Consent to Give Away Their Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1542, 1544-50 (1998)
(demonstrating that conflicts of interest exist at the stage of allocating settlement funds
among class members).
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must be developed, and if bidding is postponed until the allocation
of funds among claimants is known, a court may sidestep this
problem. But bidding on the claims of only a subset of class
members raises other issues. A defendant’s ultimate concern in
settlement is the total price tag;91 the distribution of the award
among class members is a secondary matter.92 Thus, a defendant
may have been willing to settle some claims for too much and others
for too little. If a bidder can cherry-pick the less well-compensated
claims, the defendant might end up overpaying for the settlement.
Finally, it is possible to imagine that some distributional difficulties
and inefficiencies might arise in setting up a process that pays some
claims that the defendant settled and other claims that the bidder
settled. And this would create perceptions of unfairness between
those who received higher payments through bidding and those who
did not.
On the other hand, strong arguments support the use of partial
bids. Because the bid covers only part of the class’s claims, the bid
price will be lower and more participants might be encouraged to
enter the auction. The bid can also be targeted right at the part of
the case where the problems of agency cost and insufficient
deterrence exist. In addition, if a bidder were required to bid on the
entire case, the bidder would be tempted to provide more money to
all the claimants in order to avoid ill will, objections, and opt-outs.
If some of those claims were already fairly priced in the original
settlement, requiring bidding to encompass the entire case provides
a windfall to those claimants.
Given the strong arguments on both sides, a categorical rule
seems unwise. When the parties announce a settlement, the court
should examine the nature of the case and settlement to determine
if allowing bidding on just a portion of the case is a potentially
useful means to encourage bidding and enhance the value of the
class’s claims.
91. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 25.
92. The defendant’s only distributional concern is to make sure that the distribution is not
so unfair that it is likely to invoke a large number of opt-outs or objections, which might cause
the court to disapprove the settlement. Cf. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 65, at 1563
(discussing whether a low rate of opting out acts as an indicator of a strong settlement and
concluding that “the signal is a weak one at best”).
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3. Settlements with Injunctive Relief
Some aggregate settlements involve either exclusively injunctive
relief93 or a mixture of injunctive and monetary relief.94 These cases
present a particular challenge for the auction method. A bidder
cannot command a defendant to provide the injunctive relief to
which the defendant consented in the settlement;95 thus, an auction
may cost class members’ relief that they value. Moreover, allowing
bids on just the monetary portion of the claims ignores the fact that
the defendant might not have agreed to as generous an injunction
if the defendant was also liable for greater damages. The hybrid of
injunctive and monetary claims acts a great deal like the situation
involving two claims. In that context, I have argued, auctioning one
of the claims while leaving the other in place is impermissible.96 On
the other hand, the potential to game the auction system is evident.
Unless bidding on claims involving injunctive relief is permitted,
class counsel and the defendant can make a settlement auction-
proof by adding some nontrivial injunctive relief in the settlement.97
Except in the rare case in which a successful bidder is in position
to provide identical injunctive relief,98 the auction method is poorly
suited to cases in which injunctive relief forms a valuable part of the
class settlement. At the same time, a court should not allow illusory
injunctive relief—perhaps an agreement to obey the law in the
93. See, e.g., Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc., v. Amoco Oil Co., 211 F.R.D. 457 (S.D. Fla.
2002).
94. See, e.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 287 (2011).
95. Cf. Nanette L. Stasko, Comment, Competitive Bidding in the Courthouse: In re Oracle
Securities Litigation, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1667, 1697 (1994) (noting the difficulties of adapting
the lead counsel auction to cases seeking equitable relief).
96. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
97. Such an attempt is hardly fanciful. In present class action practice, counsel sometimes
agrees to a combination of injunctive and monetary relief, and then justifies a fee that
constitutes a significant percentage of the monetary relief by arguing that the injunctive relief
is also valuable to the class. See, e.g., In re LivingSocial Mktg. & Sales Practice Litig., 298
F.R.D. 1, 15-22 (D.D.C. 2013) (rejecting counsel’s effort to include the value of the settlement’s
injunctive relief—allegedly worth $54 million—in considering the proper attorneys’ fee, and
instead awarding a fee based only on the $7.5 million in monetary relief obtained for the
class); id. at 16 (“[T]he value of injunctive relief can be so difficult to quantify.”).
98. One example is an injunction to establish medical clinics to monitor the health of class
members exposed to the defendant’s product. In theory, a successful bidder could establish
and operate the same clinics.
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future or a modest restructuring of senior management—to
immunize a substandard settlement. The difficulty lies in distin-
guishing these two situations.
Establishing hard-and-fast rules to govern this situation may be
impossible. If a court is convinced that injunctive relief is central to
the goals of the lawsuit and will provide real value to all class
members in the future, it should not permit an auction. One
intermediate solution is to separate members whose harm from the
defendant’s conduct could yet be avoided, for whom an injunction
could be valuable, from members who have already incurred
virtually all of the harm that could befall them, for whom an
injunction is valueless. Akin to its power to allow bids only on some
of the class members’ claims,99 a court may invite bids only on the
claims of class members who fit into the latter group.
4. Making Payment
An interesting practical issue not found in ordinary auctions
involves payment to the class. For simplicity’s sake, assume that the
original case settled for $1 million, and a responsible winning bid
offered $1.5 million. Must the bidder pay the entire $1.5 million—or
should the defendant pay the class the agreed $1 million and the
bidder the additional $500,000? If the latter, may the defendant
recoup the $1 million from the bidder in the event that the case is
tried and the defendant is found not liable?100 And if recoupment is
possible, must the successful bidder post a $1 million bond to ensure
its ability to repay the defendant?
Requiring a defendant to pay its agreed upon $1 million lowers
the effective cost of bidding; prospective bidders need to come up
with only $500,000 plus the cost of a bond. As a result, this ap-
proach could increase the number of potential bidders. The presence
of more bidders generally drives up the auction price, likely
enhancing revenue for the class.101 But there are some thorny
99. See supra Part III.B.2.
100. Similarly, if the trial results in a $750,000 judgment, the issue is whether the
defendant can recoup the excess $250,000 it paid.
101. See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 47, at 451 (“[W]ith more bidders, the higher the
expected price and the lower the bidders’ expected profits.”).
2014] AUCTIONING CLASS SETTLEMENTS 257
problems with split payment: the administrative costs of splitting
payment; the cost of posting a bond; the dynamics that arise as a
successful bidder tries to achieve a verdict of at least $1.5 million
while the defendant tries to drive the value of the case to something
less than $1 million; and the defendant’s likely response to split
payment, which is to offer less by way of settlement in the first
instance.
On balance, it makes more sense for a successful bidder to pay the
full amount of the bid before allowing the bidder to pursue the
class’s claims against the defendant.
C. Bidders
The question of who may bid seems to have a simple answer:
anyone with the resources to make good on the bid. And that answer
is partially correct. As part of the inquiry into a bidder’s responsibil-
ity, a court should reject a bid from any entity that fails to show the
necessary financial wherewithal.
But bidding by some entities poses problems. To explain, consider
the five types of potential bidders at an auction. The first are law
firms, which would use their internal resources to continue the
litigation. The second are private equity firms, which are entities
that might otherwise engage in third-party financing of claims. The
third are consumer advocacy groups or other nonprofit groups with
an interest in regulating the defendant’s conduct. The fourth, at
least in theory, are the defendant’s competitors. The fifth is the
defendant itself.
Working backwards, we can reject the defendant as bidder. As I
described, under certain conditions, the court may allow a defendant
to match the highest bid (on condition that the defendant compen-
sates the winning bidder for its costs investigating and analyzing
the claim).102 If bid matching is allowed, the defendant need not
participate in the bidding process. Indeed, a defendant’s participa-
tion in the auction has the likely effect of driving out potential
bidders and driving down the price of the winning bid.103 The
defendant had a chance to “bid” when it agreed to the settlement.
102. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
103. See Thomas & Hansen, supra note 47, at 448-49.
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Allowing the defendant to submit another bid frustrates an
essential purpose of a settlement auction: to force class counsel and
the defendant to make a better settlement in the first instance.
The defendant’s competitors are another source of bidders.
Competitors may have a legitimate reason to pursue a claim against
the defendant. For example, the defendant may be engaged in
slipshod practices that are negatively affecting the industry.104 Or
the purpose of the suit may be nefarious: a better financed competi-
tor may see an opportunity to drive up the defendant’s costs through
prolonged litigation, or even to bankrupt the company.105 In theory,
abuse of process and antitrust laws prevent litigation of the second
type,106 but proving an illegitimate motive is difficult and would
consume significant resources.107 Therefore, the prudent position is
not to permit competitors to bid at a settlement auction.108
104. Cf. Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972) (“We
conclude that it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold that
groups with common interests may not, without violating the antitrust laws, use the channels
and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points
of view respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-à-vis their
competitors.”).
105. A common criticism of class actions is their potential to bankrupt the defendant. See,
e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-300 (7th Cir. 1995). Although little
evidence exists that class actions presently have this effect, allowing competitors to bid
increases this potential because competitors would have an incentive to impose a crushing
liability.
106. As Judge Posner noted in Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472
(7th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted):
The existence of a tort of abuse of process shows that it has long been thought
that litigation could be used for improper purposes even when there is probable
cause for the litigation; and if the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool
for suppressing competition in its antitrust sense, ... it becomes a matter of
antitrust concern. This is not to say that litigation is actionable under the
antitrust laws merely because the plaintiff is trying to get a monopoly. He is
entitled to pursue such a goal through lawful means, including litigation against
competitors. The line is crossed when his purpose is not to win a favorable
judgment against a competitor but to harass him, and deter others, by the
process itself—regardless of outcome—of litigating.
107. See id. (noting that “the line between effective and abusive resort to legal remedies
is indistinct” and that “the evidentiary problems of disentangling real from professed motives
would be acute”).
108. In limited instances allowing a competitor to bid is appropriate. For instance, as we
have seen, the auction proposal should not generally be used in cases involving injunctive
relief. See supra Part III.B.3. In cases in which a competitor could provide better relief than
the defendant would be required to provide by injunction, and could then charge the
defendant for the cost of providing this relief, a court may consider a bid from a competitor
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Consumer advocacy and other nonprofit groups provide a third
source of bidders. Giving a class’s negative-value claims directly to
such organizations makes some economic sense.109 Some consumer
advocacy groups already appear on behalf of objectors to class
settlements.110 Bidding provides these organizations with a different
avenue for attempting to hold defendants accountable. Moreover, to
the extent that the groups argue that class members deserve better
compensation, bidding gives them a direct avenue to accomplish
that objective. A number of these organizations have attorneys on
staff, so they can keep the costs of the lawsuit against the defendant
to a minimum. The major hurdle for such groups is funding the
settlement, should they be the winning bidder.
Private equity funds or other organizations that presently engage
in third-party funding might also be bidders. These entities possess
substantial capacity to analyze the risks of litigation and assess the
likely value of claims, so they already possess the infrastructure to
participate in settlement auctions.111 Moreover, repeat players like
third-party financiers can afford to be risk neutral in their invest-
ment decisions while class members and counsel are more likely to
be risk averse. This difference in the way that they value the class’s
claims suggests that there may be room for financiers to make a
profit after winning an auction. Of course, the financial commitment
required to fund the costs of litigation, which is the present focus of
third-party financiers, is less than the commitment required to fund
as long as the competitor’s legitimate motive was clear and the provided relief was
proportional to the case. Even here, though, the risk of a competitor providing “Cadillac relief”
that pushes a competitor into financial difficulty raises concerns. I thank Simona Grossi for
pointing out the prospect of using competitors in this situation.
When a court forbids competitors to bid, it also must take steps to ensure that the source
of funding for bids from other parties, such as consumer advocacy organizations, private
investors, or law firms, does not derive from one or more of the defendant’s competitors.
109. See Hughes v. Kore of Ind. Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013). 
110. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 297, 359 (N.D. Ga.
1993) (describing consumer organizations whose work on behalf of objectors strengthened a
class settlement).
111. See Molot, supra note 3, at 73 (“[B]y enlisting the help of a third party that holds a
diverse portfolio of litigation risk and is better able to bear the risk, the weaker [i.e., risk-
averse] party could bolster its negotiating position and secure a settlement that reflects the
merits of the lawsuit rather than the relative bargaining positions of the parties.”).
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a winning bid; maintaining lawsuits in their own names represents
a shift in the present business model of such financiers.112
Finally, other law firms may be interested bidders. In some cases,
the law firms may already represent the same class members in
competing class actions.113 Some of these firms may have contended
for, but lost, the class counsel position to the firm that settled the
claim.114 Often these firms have participated in the litigation or in
similar litigation, so they have enough of a sense of the risks and
value of the claims to make an informed judgment about the
appropriate value of a settlement and a proper bid. At present,
however, law firms have few avenues to address the perceived
inadequacy of a settlement achieved by class counsel, other than to
object to the settlement on their clients’ behalf or to opt their clients
out of the case. But neither of these options typically makes sense
from the firm’s financial standpoint. Bidding provides a realistic
option by which the firm can help class members to achieve better
recoveries and assume control of litigation that the class members
believe to be more valuable than the settlement class counsel
negotiated.
Bidding by law firms also raises some of the concerns raised with
bidding by defendants’ competitors: law firms may bid on a case to
deprive a competing law firm of a full fee for its work, a prospect
which may ruin a particular firm or discourage firms in general
from entering the class action market. Unlike the situation with
competitors, a prohibition on law firm bidding is unwise. Because
class counsel receives a quantum meruit fee for the value of the
work performed on the class’s behalf leading up to the original
112. For a discussion of the issues surrounding third-party financing of litigation, see
generally Huang, supra note 3; Molot, supra note 3.
113. Competing class actions are common. Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80
B.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2000).
114. When related class actions are pending in different federal districts, they are often
consolidated in one district under the multidistrict transfer power of 28 U.S.C. § 1407. See,
e.g., In re: Toys “R” Us—Del., Inc., Fair & Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig.,
581 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2008) (ordering MDL consolidation when, among other
things, “there is a risk of inconsistent rulings on class certification”). After consolidation, the
MDL judge often chooses one counsel to lead the litigation, thus cutting out other putative
class counsel. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 20, § 10.22 (2004)
(discussing the power of a federal judge in complex litigation to appoint lead counsel); id. §
10.224 (noting the “often intense competition for appointment by the court”).
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settlement,115 another law firm’s successful bid on a single case is
unlikely to ruin class counsel’s firm or drive it from the market.116
Nonetheless, a court must be sensitive to any anticompetitive
motives behind a law firm’s bid and should disqualify a bid from a
law firm when such motives appear likely.
Others can also enter the settlement auction; perhaps one of the
class members is a billionaire who wants to see justice done.
Moreover, two or more of the three groups that are most likely to
bid—advocacy groups, private equity financiers, and law
firms—could form a bidding consortium. Permitting third-party
financiers and law firms to bid at auction also lessens some of the
least appealing aspects of third-party or law firm financing.
One problem with such financing is the injection of a new
principal into the already messy principal-agent relationship
between the class and class counsel.117 Another is the potential for
conflicts of interest when law firms enter into agreements with
another firm to finance the litigation.118 A third is the sense that
financiers are getting rich at the expense of victims by taking a
substantial portion of the class’s recovery in return for financing.119
Settlement auctions do not eliminate these problems, but they
blunt the critiques considerably. The concern for a new principal-
agent relationship is gone entirely.120 The only principal left after a
settlement auction is the winning bidder, who has an incentive to
tamp down agency costs by closely monitoring the lawyers who
continue to prosecute the claims against the defendant.121 Conflicts
between law firms and the class are no longer a relevant issue.
115. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
116. Cf. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting
that some scholars regard the use of litigation to achieve anticompetitive ends as “fanciful,”
especially when litigation involves only a single lawsuit).
117. See Huang, supra note 3, at 527.
118. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 216, 225-26 (2d Cir. 1987)
(discussing the conflicts of interest that can arise when law firms enter into fee-sharing
agreements in which one firm provides financing in return for a share of the fees).
119. See Molot, supra note 3, at 112 (“[T]ransaction costs may lead funders to offer
plaintiffs modest amounts for their claims, in the hope of turning around and settling with
the defendant for more, ... [a result that] would undermine one of the central goals of a
litigation risk-transfer system: just compensation.”).
120. See Huang, supra note 3, at 527 (explaining principal-agent relationship concerns).
121. See Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 108-09 (describing the benefits associated with
a single entity’s ownership of class members’ claims).
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Admittedly, bidding will not occur unless the bidder can anticipate
a profit, so class members are likely to receive less than the fair
market value of their claims; but class members will receive as
much as or more than they would have received under the original
settlement.122 And it bears repeating that the in terrorem effect of
settlement auctions should lead to better class settlements to begin
with, so class members should capture a larger portion of the value
of their claims.
D. The Emergence of an Auction Market
One of the concerns with a settlement auction is whether a robust
market for settled class claims will develop. Interest from bidders
will most likely arise in cases that are strong on the merits but
badly undervalued in the original settlement. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that lawyers sometimes sell out classes to enrich them-
selves,123 a claim which, if true, suggests that a market might
emerge. There is also anecdotal evidence to the contrary: that class
actions extort exorbitant sums for meritless claims,124 a claim which,
if true, suggests that class settlements are already overvalued and
no market will emerge. Empirical data to prove either of these
claims is in short supply.125
It is likely true that some class actions settle for too much, some
for roughly the right amount, and some for too little. The variance
is undoubtedly due, in part, to the risk preferences of litigants and
counsel. The settlement auction is designed to deal only with the
situation in which the class’s claims settle for too little.126 Should no
122. See supra Part III.B.1.
123. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 4 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 5-6 (“[S]tate
court judges are readily approving class action settlements that offer little—if any—mean-
ingful recovery to the class members and simply transfer money from corporations to class
counsel.”); id. at 14-20, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 15-20 (providing examples of cases
in which counsel appeared to receive much of the value of the settlement).
124. See id. at 20-21, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 21 (arguing that the size of a
potential class judgment provides “leverage [that] can essentially force corporate defendants
to pay ransom to class attorneys by settling—rather than litigating—frivolous lawsuits”).
125. See, e.g., ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2012 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS (2013), available at
http://perma.cc/WBQ2-DVS3 (noting that, among securities-fraud cases settled between 2003
and 2012, median settlements ranged from 1.6 percent to 3.3 percent of estimated damages).
126. See supra Part III.A.
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bidders emerge, a judge has some assurance that the class’s claims
are settled at market value.127 Whether a market emerges in
settlement auctions will provide a real-world test of the value of
class settlements.
Even if class settlements are undervalued, a market may not
emerge. As I have argued, a proper attorneys’ fee structure and a
correctly calibrated opt-out right should already discourage
undervalued class settlements.128 Another practical obstacle to the
development of such a market is the availability of financing for
bidders. It may be one thing for law firms or third-party financiers
to take on the risk of loss when financing the legal expenses in a
case, but taking on the risk of losing the bid price is a much larger
proposition for which funders are likely to be scarcer.
On this point, however, empirical data does not suggest that
financiers must come up with tens of millions of dollars in every
settlement auction.129 The median class action in either state or
federal court appears to settle for something in the six-figure
range.130 Thus, the wherewithal to finance a successful bid in many
class actions is not out of reach for a wide array of private investors,
law firms, and consumer-advocacy groups.
An intriguing idea is an investor’s ability to securitize a portfo-
lio of lawsuits won at auction. Such investors might then cut up
the claims into tranches based on the level of risk involved.131
127. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part II.
129. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging & Shannon R. Wheatman, Attorney Choice of Forum in
Class Action Litigation: What Difference Does It Make?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 591 (2006)
(providing data as to settlement amounts).
130. For class actions removed to federal court and then remanded back to state court, one
study found that the median settlement or recovery was $850,000, or $350 per class member.
Id. at 639 tbl.15. The median settlement or recovery for class actions remaining in federal
court was $300,000, or $517 per class member. Id.
131. Cf. Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty
of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 670-76 (2013) (discussing the process of securitization
in mortgage markets). The recent financial crisis, which was caused largely by the collapse
of mortgage-backed securities, gave securitization a black eye. But securitization has
significant benefits, including the ability to raise more funds. See id. at 671. Nor would the
amount of money at stake in securitized lawsuits approach a level likely to cause widespread
financial collapse. For the story of one case in which a bank holding a valuable legal claim
securitized the claim and even traded it on a market, see Benjamin C. Esty, The Information
Content of Litigation Participation Securities: The Case of CalFed Bancorp, 60 J. FIN. ECON.
371, 372-74 (2001). In this instance, a bank’s value increased by 4.3 percent after
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Securitization could be an attractive way to lure investors into the
auction market.132
There is no guarantee that a settlement auction market will
emerge. Even if it did emerge, the threat of settlement auctions may
improve the quality of settlements to a point that investors can no
longer find attractive class settlements on which to bid, and
investors will leave the market for other opportunities. Class
counsel and defendants might then return to the present status quo.
But that return seems unlikely for two reasons. First, if class
settlements again become significantly undervalued, bidders may
return to the market. Second, once the prospect or reality of
settlement auctions props up the value of class settlements, courts
will have a new benchmark for determining whether class settle-
ments are “fair, reasonable, and adequate,”133 and for disapproving
settlements that are not.
E. The Timing of Opt-Outs
Along with settlement auctions and an hourly-plus-percentage-of-
net-recovery attorneys’ fee, an opt-out right helps to ensure that
class members receive fair value for their claims.134 In a settlement
auction the timing of the opt-out right matters. If class members opt
out before the settlement is put up for bid, then bidders have a
better sense of the value of the claims on which they are bidding.
But opt-outs might have remained in the case had they received the
higher amount promised in the winning bid. On the other hand, if
class members opt out after the award of the winning bid, the
winning bidder must be allowed to adjust the bid to account for the
decrease in value of the class’s claims due to the exit of some class
members. That adjustment might then set off a new round of opt-
out rights, with a new round of adjustments, followed by a new set
securitization, likely because the bank’s ability to securitize and value its risky asset made
it a more valuable takeover target.
132. See Molot, supra note 3, at 96 (noting that investments in litigation are attractive to
hedge funds because litigation outcomes do not depend on market fluctuations, as a result of
which “hedge funds seeking a diverse portfolio of investments have tried to earn returns by
betting on litigation”).
133. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2).
134. See supra notes 51, 56-58 and accompanying text.
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of opt-out rights—until eventually no one opts out. This process
could be time-consuming and delay the settlement, as well as
resolution of the underlying dispute against the defendant, for
months or years.
As a practical matter, the evils of providing post-bid opt-out rights
are greater. Therefore, once the original settlement is negotiated, a
court should permit a period for opting out, and then put the
settlement up for auction. If a bid higher than the class settlement
emerges, the winning bidder should, on request, be given access to
the identities of those who have opted out. The winning bidder can
then determine whether to contact the opt-outs to request that they
opt back into the settlement under the bid’s terms. If any claimants
opt in, their claims become the property of the winning bidder, just
as are the claims of those who did not opt out.
F. Apportioning Fees
There remains a final, and rather tricky, problem: handling the
compensation of class counsel when a winning bidder emerges.
Some compensation is appropriate. The class counsel’s work
produced the original—albeit inadequate—settlement, as well as the
discovery that served as the basis on which bidders prepared their
offers.135 On the other hand, a court should not award the fee that
would have been awarded if the original settlement had been
approved; otherwise, class counsel has no incentive to avoid
negotiating an inadequate settlement.
Therefore, a court should compensate counsel on a quantum
meruit basis for work that benefited the class or bidders.136 In
135. See text accompanying supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing pre-auction
discovery).
136. As a rule, lawyers are entitled to a fee based on quantum meruit when their
representation falls below ethical or professional standards—thus disentitling them to their
full fee—or their representation is properly terminated. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 37 (2000) (“A lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of
duty to a client may be required to forfeit some or all of the lawyer’s compensation for the
matter.”); id. § 37 cmt. d (suggesting that a quantum meruit recovery for the lawyer might be
appropriate); id. § 40 (suggesting a fee of “the lesser of the fair market value of the lawyer’s
services” or “the ratable proportion of the compensation” under the lawyer’s contract when
the attorney-client relationship was terminated). If the actions of counsel amount to collusion
with the defendant, even this fee may be too high and a complete forfeiture of class counsel’s
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general, the hourly market rate should determine the fee. A
deduction from the fee should be made for the reasonable time that
the winning bidder’s counsel must spend to come up to speed on the
case. The winning bidder need not pay twice for the same work.
Limiting the fee in this way deters class counsel from negotiating a
settlement so substandard that it will attract potential bidders’
attention, while also preventing a windfall to the winning bidder.
The difficult question is the timing of the payment to class
counsel. One issue is whether compensation should be made at the
time of the bid award or rather when the case concludes. Another
issue is whether counsel should receive any compensation if the
bidder loses the case or recovers less than the amount of the original
settlement.
On the first issue, the better approach is to delay compensation
until the case is resolved, so that the court can determine both the
contribution of class counsel and the appropriate fee deductions.
The answer to the second question is more nettlesome. The failure
of the winning bidder to achieve a result as good as the one class
counsel negotiated shines a new light on the value of class counsel’s
work in negotiating the settlement. Moreover, the chance that
counsel will receive no compensation due to events beyond their
control—the entry of a bidder into the case—may discourage
lawyers from becoming class counsel, and may thus deprive society
of the deterrence benefits that class actions can provide. But a flat
rule that class counsel should receive quantum meruit compensa-
tion regardless of outcome may drive up the cost of bidding and
discourage entry into the auction market, unless the class’s claims
are near-certain winners that the settlement badly undervalues.
Compensation independent of outcome also converts class counsel’s
contingency agreement into a guaranteed fee, even when counsel
has poorly served the class.
The question’s closeness makes establishing a categorical rule
difficult. In the early years, when an auction market is still
emerging, the presumption should be against compensating class
counsel when the bidder fails to recover. Likewise, compensation on
fee may be appropriate. See id. § 37 cmt. b (discussing the principle of agency that “willful and
deliberate breach disentitles agent to recover in quantum meruit”). I assume in this
discussion that class counsel’s conduct does not merit a complete forfeiture of the fee.
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a partial, pro rata basis is appropriate when the bidder achieves a
result less favorable than the original settlement. Among the factors
that could overcome the presumption are bad faith by the bidder137
and the incompetence of the bidder’s lawyers in handling the
claim.138 Creating a presumption against compensation provides an
incentive for class counsel to negotiate a bid-proof settlement; it
should not discourage ethical lawyers from becoming class counsel. 
CONCLUSION
In class actions, settlement is where the rubber meets the road.
The precise level of deterrence that the defendant faces becomes
clear, and the cracks between the interests of class and counsel are
exposed. If class actions are to do a better job achieving deterrence
and compensation, while minimizing agency costs, adequate
settlements are essential. Those who wish to improve class actions
must concentrate their energy on the settlement process.
No single approach to ensuring the adequacy of settlements is
sufficient. To some extent a procedural protection—a limited opt-out
right—is a useful device to encourage better settlements. An
incentive to class counsel, in the form of an hourly-and-percentage-
of-net-recovery fee, is another useful device. Both of these measures
seek to achieve substantively adequate settlements through indirect
means. Even with these measures in place, a court should also
attempt to gauge the substantive quality of the outcome. The
present approach to determining whether a settlement is substan-
tively “fair, reasonable, and adequate” is insufficient because a court
operates with limited information about the strength of the settled
claims. The settlement auction, which tests the value of the
settlement in the market, is the best way to determine the quality
of the settlement directly.
137. For a discussion of some of the ways in which bidders may use the bidding process to
harm the defendant, see supra Part III.C.
138. The ground of incompetence is a slippery one. As in a legal malpractice case, the
theory is that incompetence resulted in a worse outcome than competent lawyering would
have achieved. To make this argument, class counsel may need to concede their own
incompetence (in other words, admit that competent lawyering by the bidder’s counsel would
have resulted in a greater award than the award class counsel achieved). In such a
circumstance, a substantial limit on the recoverable fee is likely.
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Standing alone, settlement auctions are not a perfect solution.
They generate a series of practical issues that frustrate, to some
degree, the auction’s intended purpose. Working through these
practical issues requires a constant focus on the aims of the auction
process and, indeed, of class actions more generally: increasing
deterrence and reducing the agency costs that thwart the delivery
of adequate compensation to class members. As a means to achieve
these goals, the settlement auction deserves its time in the sun.
